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Abstract
For a standard convolutional neural network, optimizing over the input pixels to
maximize the score of some target class will generally produce a grainy-looking
version of the original image. However, Santurkar et al. (2019) demonstrated that
for adversarially-trained neural networks, this optimization produces images that
uncannily resemble the target class. In this paper, we show that these perceptually-
aligned gradients also occur under randomized smoothing, an alternative means of
constructing adversarially-robust classifiers. Our finding supports the hypothesis
that perceptually-aligned gradients may be a general property of robust classifiers.
We hope that our results will inspire research aimed at explaining this link between
perceptually-aligned gradients and adversarial robustness.
1 Introduction
Classifiers are called adversarially robust if they achieve high accuracy even on adversarially-
perturbed inputs [1, 2]. Two effective techniques for constructing robust classifiers are adversarial
training and randomized smoothing. In adversarial training, a neural network is optimized via a
min-max objective to achieve high accuracy on adversarially-perturbed training examples [1, 3, 4]. In
randomized smoothing, a neural network is smoothed by convolution with Gaussian noise [5, 6, 7, 8].
Recently, [9, 10, 11] demonstrated that adversarially-trained networks exhibit perceptually-aligned
gradients: iteratively updating an image by gradient ascent so as to maximize the score assigned to a
target class will render an image that perceptually resembles the target class.
In this paper, we show that smoothed neural networks also exhibit perceptually-aligned gradients.
This finding supports the conjecture in [9, 10, 11] that perceptually-aligned gradients may be a general
property of robust classifiers, and not only a curious consequence of adversarial training. Since the
root cause behind the apparent relationship between adversarial robustness and perceptual alignment
remains unclear, we hope that our findings will spur foundational research aimed at explaining this
connection.
Perceptually-aligned gradients Let f : Rd → Rk be a neural network image classifier that maps
from images in Rd to scores for k classes. Naively, one might hope that by starting with any image
x0 ∈ Rd and taking gradient steps so as to maximize the score of a target class t ∈ [k], we would
produce an altered image that better resembled (perceptually) the targeted class. However, as shown
in Figure 1, when f is a vanilla-trained neural network, this is not the case; iteratively following the
gradient of class t’s score appears perceptually as a noising of the image. In the nascent literature on
the explainability of deep learning, this problem has been addressed by adding explicit regularizers to
the optimization problem [12, 13, 14, 15]. However, [10] showed that for adversarially-trained neural
networks, these explicit regularizers aren’t needed — merely following the gradient of a target class t
will render images that visually resemble class t.
NeurIPS 2019 Workshop on “Science Meets Engineering of Deep Learning.”
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
08
64
0v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
3 O
ct 
20
19
Figure 1: Large- targeted adversarial examples for a vanilla-trained network, an adversarially trained
network, and a smoothed network. Adversarial examples for both robust classifiers visually resemble
the targeted class, while adversarial examples for the vanilla classifier do not. All of these adversarial
examples have perturbation size  = 40 (on images with pixels scaled to [0, 1]).
Randomized smoothing Across many studies, adversarially-trained neural networks have proven
empirically successful at resisting adversarial attacks within the threat model in which they were
trained [16, 17]. Unfortunately, when the networks are large and expressive, no known algorithms are
able to provably certify this robustness [18], leaving open the possibility that they will be vulnerable
to better adversarial attacks developed in the future.
For this reason, a distinct approach to robustness called randomized smoothing has recently gained
traction in the literature [5, 6, 7, 8]. In the `2-robust version of randomized smoothing, the robust
classifier fˆσ : Rd → Rk is a smoothed neural network of the form:
fˆσ(x) = Eε∼N (0,σ2I)[f(x + ε)] (1)
where f : Rd → Rk is a neural network (ending in a softmax) called the base network. In other
words, fˆσ(x), the smoothed network’s predicted scores at x, is the weighted average of f within the
neighborhood around x, where points are weighted according to an isotropic Gaussian centered at x
with variance σ2. A disadvantage of randomized smoothing is that the smoothed network fˆσ cannot
be evaluated exactly, due to the expectation in (1), and instead must approximated via Monte Carlo
sampling. However, by computing fˆσ(x) one can obtain a guarantee that fˆσ’s prediction is constant
within an `2 ball around x; in contrast, it is not currently possible to obtain such certificates using
neural network classifiers. See Appendix B for more background on randomized smoothing.
How to best train the base network f to maximize the certified accuracy of the smoothed network fˆσ
remains an open question in the literature. In [5, 7], the base network f was trained with Gaussian
data augmentation. However, [19, 6] showed that training f instead using stability training [20]
resulted in substantially higher certified accuracy, and [8] showed that training f by adversarially
training fˆσ also outperformed Gaussian data augmentation. Our main experiments use a base network
trained with Gaussian data augmentation. In Appendix C we compare against the network from [8].
2 Experiments
In this paper, we show that smoothed neural networks exhibit perceptually-aligned gradients. By
design, our experiments mirror those conducted in [10]. To begin, we synthesize large- targeted
adversarial examples for a smoothed (σ = 0.5) ResNet-50 trained on ImageNet [21, 22]. Given some
source image x0, we used projected gradient descent (PGD) to find an image x∗ within `2 distance 
of x0 that the smoothed network fˆσ classifies confidently as target class t. Specifically, decomposing
Figure 2: Large- adversarial examples for a smoothed neural network. Each row is a (random)
starting image, each column is a (random) target class. See Figures 5-6 in Appendix A for more.
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Figure 3: Class-conditional image synthesis using a smoothed NN. To synthesize an image from
class t, we sampled a seed image from a multivariate Gaussian fit to images from class t, and then
performed PGD to maximize the score of class t. Figures 7-8 in Appendix A have more examples.
f as f(x) = softmax(logits(x)), we solve the problem:
x∗ = arg max
x: ‖x−x0‖≤
Eε∼N (0,σ2I)[logits(x + ε)t]. (2)
We find that optimizing (2) yields visually more compelling results than minimizing the cross-entropy
loss of fˆσ . See Appendix C for a comparison between (2) and the cross-entropy approach.
The gradient of the objective (2) cannot be computed exactly, due to the expectation over ε, so
we instead used an unbiased estimator obtained by sampling N = 20 noise vectors ε1, . . . , εN ∼
N (0, σ2I) and computing the average gradient 1N
∑N
i=1∇x logits(x + εi)t.
Figure 1 depicts large- targeted adversarial examples for a vanilla-trained neural network, an
adversarially trained network [4], and a smoothed network. Observe that the adversarial examples for
the vanilla network do not take on coherent features of the target class, while the adversarial examples
for both robust networks do. Figure 2 shows large- targeted adversarial examples synthesized for the
smoothed network for a variety of different target classes.
Next, as in [10], we use the smoothed network to class-conditionally synthesize images. To generate
an image from class t, we sample a seed image x0 from a multivariate Gaussian fit to images from
class t, and then we iteratively take gradient steps to maximize the score of class t using objective
(2). Figure 3 shows two images synthesized in this way from each of seven ImageNet classes. The
synthesized images appear visually similar to instances of the target class, though they often lack
global coherence — the synthesized solar dish includes multiple overlapping solar dishes.
Noise Level σ Smoothed neural networks have a hyperparameter σ which controls a robust-
ness/accuracy tradeoff: when σ is high, the smoothed network is more robust, but less accurate
[5, 7]. We investigated the effect of σ on the perceptual quality of generated images. Figure 4 shows
large- adversarial examples crafted for smoothed networks with σ varying in {0.25, 0.50, 1.00}.
Observe that when σ is large, PGD tends to paint single instance of the target class; when σ is small,
PGD tends to add spatially scattered features.
Other concerns In Appendix C, we study the effects of the following factors on the perceptual
quality of the generated images: the number of Monte Carlo noise samples N , the loss function
used for PGD, and whether the base network f is trained using Gaussian data augmentation [5, 7] or
SMOOTHADV [8].
Figure 4: Large- adversarial examples crafted for smoothed neural networks with different settings
of the smoothing scale hyperparameter σ. More examples are in Figures 9-11 in Appendix A.
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A Additional images
Figure 5: Large- adversarial examples for a smoothed neural network (part 1 / 2). Each row is a
randomly chosen starting image, each column is a randomly chosen target class.
6
Figure 6: Large- adversarial examples for a smoothed neural network (part 2 / 2). Each row is a
randomly chosen starting image, each column is a randomly chosen target class.
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(a) cat
(b) panda
(c) barber shop
(d) mug
Figure 7: Class-conditional synthesized images (part 1 / 2). To synthesize an image from class t, we
sampled a seed image from a multivariate Gaussian distribution fit to class t, and then performed
PGD to maximize the score which a smoothed neural network assigns to class t. The top row shows
the seed image, the bottom row shows the result of PGD.
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(a) computer
(b) solar dish
(c) broccoli
Figure 8: Class-conditional synthesized images (part 2 / 2). To synthesize an image from class t, we
sampled a starting image from a multivariate Gaussian distribution fit to class t, and then performed
PGD to maximize the score which a smoothed neural network assigns to class t. The top row shows
the seed image, the bottom row shows the result of PGD.
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Figure 9: Large- adversarial examples crafted for smoothed neural networks with different settings
of the smoothing scale hyperparameter σ (part 1 / 3). Images and target classes were randomly
chosen. When σ is large, the adversary tends to paint a single, coherent instance of the target class;
when σ is small, the adversary tends to paint scattered features of the target class. Note that σ = 0.0
corresponds to a vanilla-trained network.
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Figure 10: Large- adversarial examples crafted for smoothed neural networks with different settings
of the smoothing scale hyperparameter σ (part 2 / 3). Images and target classes were randomly
chosen. When σ is large, the adversary tends to paint a single, coherent instance of the target class;
when σ is small, the adversary tends to paint scattered features of the target class. Note that σ = 0.0
corresponds to a vanilla-trained network.
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Figure 11: Large- adversarial examples crafted for smoothed neural networks with different settings
of the smoothing scale hyperparameter σ (part 3 / 3). Images and target classes were randomly
chosen. When σ is large, the adversary tends to paint a single, coherent instance of the target class;
when σ is small, the adversary tends to paint scattered features of the target class. Note that σ = 0.0
corresponds to a vanilla-trained network.
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Figure 12: Large- targeted adversarial examples for a vanilla-trained network, an adversarially
trained network [4], and a smoothed network. Adversarial examples for both robust classifiers
visually resemble the targeted class, while adversarial examples for the vanilla classifier do not. All
of these adversarial examples have perturbation size  = 40 (on images with pixels scaled to [0, 1]).
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B Randomized Smoothing
Randomized smoothing is relatively new to the literature, and few comprehensive references exist.
Therefore, in this appendix, we review some basic aspects of the technique.
Preliminaries Randomized smoothing refers to a class of adversarial defenses in which the robust
classifier g : Rd → [k] that maps from an input in Rd to a class in [k] := {1, . . . , k} is defined as:
g(x) = arg max
y∈[k]
ET [f(T (x))]y.
Here, f : Rd → ∆k is a neural network “base classifier” which maps from an input in Rd to a vector
of class scores in ∆k := {z ∈ Rk : z ≥ 0,
∑k
j=1 zj = 1}, the probability simplex of non-negative
k-vectors that sum to 1. T is a randomization operation which randomly corrupts inputs in Rd to
other inputs in Rd, i.e. for any x, T (x) is a random variable.
Intuitively, the score which the smoothed classifier g assigns to class y for the input x is defined to be
the expected score that the base classifier f assigns to the class y for the random input T (x).
The requirement that f returns outputs in the probability simplex ∆k can be satisfied in either of
two ways. In the “soft smoothing” formulation (presented in the main paper), f is a neural network
which ends in a softmax. In the “hard smoothing” formulation, f returns the indicator vector for a
particular class, i.e. a length-k vector with one 1 and the rest zeros, without exposing the intermediate
class scores. In the hard smoothing formulation, since the expectation of an indicator function is a
probability, the smoothed classifier g(x) can be interpreted as returning the most probable prediction
by the classifier f over the random variable T (x). Note that no papers have yet studied soft smoothing
as a certified defense, though [8] approximated a hard smoothing classifier with the corresponding
soft classifier in order to attack it.
When the base classifier f is a neural network, the smoothed classifier g cannot be evaluated exactly,
since it is not possible to exactly compute the expectation of a neural network’s prediction over a
random input. However, by repeatedly sampling the random vector f(T (x)), one can obtain upper
and lower bounds on the expected value of each entry of that vector, which hold with high probability
over the sampling procedure. In the hard smoothing case, since each entry of f(T (x)) is a Bernoulli
random variable, one can use standard Bernoulli confidence intervals like the Clopper-Pearson, as
in [5, 7]. In the soft smoothing case, since each entry of f(T (x)) is bounded in [0, 1], one can use
Hoeffding-style concentration inequalities to derive high-probability confidence intervals for the
entries of f(T (x)) .
Gaussian smoothing When T is an additive Gaussian corruption,
T (x) = x + ε, ε ∼ N (0, σ2I),
the robust classifier g : Rd → [k] is given by:
g(x) = arg max
j∈[k]
fˆσ(x) where fˆσ(x) = Eε∼N (0,σ2I)[f(x + ε)]. (3)
Gaussian-smoothed classifiers are certifiably robust under the `2 norm: for any input x, if we know
fˆσ(x), we can certify that g’s prediction will remain constant within an `2 ball around x:
Theorem 1 (Extension to “soft smoothing” of Theorem 1 from [7]; see also Appendix A in [8]). Let
f : Rd → ∆k be any function, and define g and fˆσ as in (3). For some x ∈ Rd, let y1, y2 ∈ [k] be
the indices of the largest and second-largest entries of fˆσ(x). Then g(x + δ) = y1 for any δ with
‖δ‖2 ≤ σ
2
(
Φ−1(fˆσ(x)y1)− Φ−1(fˆσ(x)y2)
)
.
Theorem 1 is easy to prove using the following mathematical fact:
Lemma 2 (Lemma 2 from [8], Lemma 1 from [23]). Let h : Rd → [0, 1] be any function, and define
its Gaussian convolution hˆσ as hˆσ(x) = Eε∼N (0,σ2I)[h(x + ε)]. Then, for any input x ∈ Rd and
any perturbation δ ∈ Rd,
Φ
(
Φ−1(hˆσ(x))− ‖δ‖2
σ
)
≤ hˆσ(x + δ) ≤ Φ
(
Φ−1(hˆσ(x)) +
‖δ‖2
σ
)
.
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Intuitively, Lemma 2 says that hˆσ(x + δ) cannot be too much larger or too much smaller than hˆσ(x).
If this has the feel of a Lipschitz guarantee, there is good reason: Lemma 2 is equivalent to the
statement that the function x 7→ Φ−1(hˆσ(x)) is 1/σ-Lipschitz.
Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 2:
Proof of Theorem 1. Since the outputs of fˆσ live in the probability simplex, for each class j the
function fˆσ(·)j has output bounded in [0, 1], and hence can be viewed as a function hˆσ for which the
condition of Lemma 2 applies.
Therefore, from applying Lemma 2 to fˆσ(·)y1 , we know that:
fˆσ(x + δ)y1 ≥ Φ
(
Φ−1(fˆσ(x)y1)−
‖δ‖2
σ
)
and, for any j, from applying Lemma 2 to fˆσ(·)j , we know that:
Φ
(
Φ−1(fˆσ(x)j) +
‖δ‖2
σ
)
≥ fˆσ(x + δ)j .
Combining these two results, it follows that a sufficient condition for fˆσ(x + δ)y1 ≥ fˆσ(x + δ)j is:
Φ
(
Φ−1(fˆσ(x)y1)−
‖δ‖2
σ
)
≥ Φ
(
Φ−1(fˆσ(x)j) +
‖δ‖2
σ
)
,
or equivalently,
‖δ‖2 ≤ σ
2
(Φ−1(fˆσ(x)y1 − Φ−1(fˆσ(x)j)).
Hence, we can conclude that fˆσ(x + δ)y1 ≥ maxj 6=y1 fˆσ(x + δ)j so long as
‖δ‖2 ≤ min
j 6=y1
{σ
2
(Φ−1(fˆσ(x)y1 − Φ−1(fˆσ(x)j))
}
=
σ
2
(Φ−1(fˆσ(x)y1 − Φ−1(fˆσ(x)y2))
Training Given a dataset, a base classifier architecture, and a smoothing level σ > 0, it currently
an active research question to figure out the best way to train the base classifier f so that the
smoothed classifier g will attain high certified or empirical robust accuracies. The original randomized
smoothing paper [5] proposed training f with Gaussian data augmentation and the standard cross-
entropy loss. However, [8] and [6, 19] showed that alternative training schemes yield substantial
gains in certified accuracy. In particular, [8] proposed training f by performing adversarial training
on g, and [6, 19] proposed training f via stability training [20].
Related work Gaussian smoothing was first proposed as a certified adversarial defense by [5] under
the name “PixelDP,” though similar techniques had been proposed earlier as a heuristic defenses
in [24, 25]. Subsequently, [6] proved a stronger robustness guarantee, and finally [7] derived the
tightest possible robustness guarantee in the “hard smooothing” case, which was extended to the “soft
smoothing” case by [23, 8].
Concurrently, [26] proved a robustness guarantee in `∞ norm for Gaussian smoothing; however, since
Gaussian smoothing specifically confers `2 (not `∞) robustness [7], the certified accuracy numbers
reported in [26] were weak.
[27] gave theoretical and empirical arguments for an adversarial defense similar to randomized
smoothing, but did not position their method as a certified defense.
[28] have extended randomized smoothing beyond Gaussian noise / `2 norm by proposing a random-
ization scheme which allows for certified robustness in the `0 norm.
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C Details on Generating Images
This appendix details the procedure used to generate the images that appeared in this paper.
As in [10], to generate an image x∗ ∈ Rd near the starting image x0 that is classified by a smoothed
neural network fˆσ as some target class t, we use projected steepest descent to solve the optimization
problem:
x∗ = arg min
x: ‖x−x0‖2≤
L(fˆσ,x, t) (4)
where L is a loss function measuring the extent to which fˆσ classifies x as class t.
The two big choices which need to be made are: which loss function to use, and how to compute its
gradient?
Loss functions for adversarially-trained networks We first review two loss functions for gener-
ating images using adversarially-trained neural networks. Our loss functions for smoothed neural
networks (presented below) are inspired by these.
The first is the cross-entropy loss. If f adv : Rd → ∆k is an (adversarially trained) neural network
classifier that ends in a softmax layer (so that its output lies on the probability simplex ∆k), the
cross-entropy loss is defined as:
LCE(f
adv,x, t) := − log f adv(x)t.
The second is the “target class max” (TCM) loss. If we write f adv as f adv(x) = softmax(logits(x)),
where logits : Rd → Rk is f adv minus the final softmax layer, then the TCM loss is defined as:
LTCM(f
adv,x, t) := − logits(x)t.
In other words, minimizing LTCM will maximize the score that logits assigns to class t.
Since f adv is just a neural network, computing the gradients of these loss functions can be easily done
using automatic differentiation. (The situation is more complicated for smoothed neural networks.)
We note that [10] used LCE in their experiments.
Loss functions for smoothed networks Our loss functions for smoothed neural networks are
inspired by those described above for adversarially trained networks. If fˆσ is a smoothed neural
network of the form fˆσ(x) = Eε∼N (0,σ2I)[f(x+ ε)], with f a neural network that ends in a softmax
layer, then the cross-entropy loss is defined as:
LCE(fˆσ,x, t) := − log fˆσ(x)t = − logEε∼N (0,σ2I)[f(x + ε)t]. (5)
If we decompose f as f(x) = softmax(logits(x)), where logits : Rd → Rk is f minus the softmax
layer, then the TCM loss is defined as:
LTCM(fˆσ,x, t) := −Eε∼N (0,σ2I)[logits(x + ε)t]. (6)
In other words, minimizing LTCM will maximize the expected logit of class t for the random input
x + ε
Gradient estimators To solve problem (4) using PGD, we need to be able to compute the gradient
of the objective w.r.t x. However, for smoothed neural networks, it is not possible to exactly compute
the gradient of either LCE or LTCM. We therefore must resort to gradient estimates obtained using
Monte Carlo sampling.
For LTCM, we use the following unbiased gradient estimator:
∇xLTCM(fˆσ,x, t) ≈ − 1
N
N∑
i=1
∇x logits(x + εi)t, εi ∼ N (0, σ2I)
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This estimator is unbiased since
Eε1,...,εN∼N (0,σ2I)
[
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
∇x logits(x + εi)t
]
= Eε∼N (0,σ2I) [−∇x logits(x + ε)t]
= ∇x Eε∼N (0,σ2I) [− logits(x + ε)t] .
For LCE, we are unaware of any unbiased gradient estimator, so, following [8], we use the following
biased “plug-in” gradient estimator:
∇xLCE(fˆσ,x, t) ≈ ∇x
[
− log
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
f(x + εi)t
)]
, εi ∼ N (0, σ2I)
Experimental comparison between loss functions Figure 13 shows large- adversarial examples
crafted for a smoothed neural network using both LTCM and LCE. The adversarial examples crafted
using LTCM seem to better perceptually resemble the target class. Therefore, in this work we primarily
use LTCM.
Experimental comparison between training procedures For most of the figures in this paper,
we used a base classifier from [7] trained using Gaussian data augmentation. However, in Figures
15-17, we compare large- adversarial examples for this base classifier to those synthesized for a base
classifier trained using the SMOOTHADV procedure from [8], which was shown in that paper to attain
much better certified accuracies than the network from [7]. We find that there does not seem to be a
large difference in the perceptual quality of the generated images. Therefore, throughout this paper
we used the network from [7], since we wanted to emphasize that perceptually-aligned gradients arise
even with robust classifiers that do not involve adversarial training of any kind.
Experimental study of number of Monte Carlo samples One important question is how many
Monte Carlo samples N are needed when computing the gradient of LTCM or LCE. In Figure 14 we
show large- adversarial examples synthesized using N ∈ {1, 5, 20, 25, 50, 75}Monte Carlo samples.
There does not seem to be a large difference between using N = 20 samples or using more than 20.
Images synthesized using N = 1 samples do appear a bit less developed than the others (e.g. the
terrier with N = 1 is has fewer ears than when N is large.) In this work, we primarily used N = 20.
Hyperparameters The following table shows the hyperparameter settings for all of the figures in
this paper.
Figure σ number of PGD steps  PGD step size N
1, 12 0.5 300 40.0 2.8 (vanilla), 0.7 20
2 0.5 300 40.0 0.7 20
3 0.5 300 40.0 0.7 20
4, 9-11 vary 300 40.0 2.8 (σ = 0), 0.7 20
15-17 0.5, 1.0 300 40.0 0.7 20
13 0.5 300 40.0 2.0 (CE), 0.7 20
14 0.5 300 40.0 0.7 vary
Note that Figures 1 and 12 only use stepSize = 2.8 in the Vanilla column, Figure 13 only uses stepSize
= 2.0 in the C-E Loss column, and Figures 4 and 9-11 only use stepSize = 2.8 for σ = 0.
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Figure 13: Here, we compare the perceptual quality of large- adversarial examples (for a smoothed
neural network) crafted using the cross-entropy loss LCE to those crafted using the target class max
LTCM loss. Observe that adversarial examples crafted using the TCM loss seem to better resemble
the targeted class. For this reason, we used the TCM loss function throughout this paper.
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Figure 14: Large- adversarial examples for a smoothed neural network crafted using different
settings of the parameter N , the number of Monte Carlo samples used for gradient estimation.
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Figure 15: We compare (part 1/3) large- targeted adversarial examples for smoothed networks
trained using Gaussian data augmentation [5, 7] (columns “Smooth”) to those for smoothed networks
trained using the SMOOTHADV algorithm of [8], i.e. adversarial training on the smoothed classifier
(columns “Adv. Smooth”).
20
Figure 16: We compare (part 2/3) large- targeted adversarial examples for smoothed networks
trained using Gaussian data augmentation [5, 7] (columns “Smooth”) to those for smoothed networks
trained using the SMOOTHADV algorithm of [8], i.e. adversarial training on the smoothed classifier
(columns “Adv. Smooth”).
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Figure 17: We compare (part 3/3) large- targeted adversarial examples for smoothed networks
trained using Gaussian data augmentation [5, 7] (columns “Smooth”) to those for smoothed networks
trained using the SMOOTHADV algorithm of [8], i.e. adversarial training on the smoothed classifier
(columns “Adv. Smooth”).
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